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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") defines income
broadly to include wealth from almost every source,1 while at the
same time exempting a number of items for various tax and public
policy reasons.2  One such policy-based exemption is section
104(a)(2)-the Personal Injuries Exemption-which exempts from tax
"any damages ... received on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness."3 The Personal Injuries Exemption, however, exists in a state of
1. 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994). See Commissioner v. Schleier, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044, *9 (1995)
("We have repeatedly emphasized the 'sweeping scope' of this section and its statutory predeces-
sors"). See also Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (giving the
modern, broad definition of income: "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over
which the taxpayers have complete dominion"). For the pre-Glenshaw Glass definition of
income, see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (defining income more narrowly as
"the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined").
2. See, for example, 26 U.S.C. §§ 101-137 (1994) ("Items Specifically Excluded From
Gross Income!).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994) reads:
Compensation for injuries or sickness
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess
of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses)
for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation
for personal injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal
injuries or sickness;
(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal in-
juries or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the
extent such amounts (A) are attributable to contributions by the em-
ployer which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or
(B) are paid by the employer);
(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for per-
sonal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed
forces of any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey or the Public
Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable under the provisions of
section 808 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980; and
(5) amounts received by an individual as disability income attributable to
injuries incurred as a direct result of a violent attack which the
Secretary of State determines to be a terrorist attack and which occurred
while such individual was an employee of the United States engaged in
the performance of his official duties outside the United States.
For purposes of paragraph (3), in the case of an individual who is, or has been, an
employee within the meaning of section 401(c)(1) (relating to self-employed individuals),
contributions made on behalf of such individual while he was such an employee to a
trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a), or under
a plan described in section 403(a), shall, to the extent allowed as deductions under sec-
tion 404, be treated as contributions by the employer which were not includible in the
gross income of the employee. Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in
connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness.
The final sentence was added as an amendment in 1989 and only affects awards received after
July 10, 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a) (1989).
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disarray and needs amending. Since its inception, this exemption has
lacked both clear definitions of its key terms and a sound theoretical
foundation. 4 Moreover, although courts traditionally read exemptions
narrowly,5 they have interpreted section 104(a)(2) broadly and have
applied it in a number of situations where it was not meant to be
applied.6 As a result, the exemption now serves largely as an incen-
tive to sue and as a windfall for those taxpayers fortunate enough to
fall within its scope.7 So great is the disagreement over how to deal
with these problems that between 1992 and 1994 the federal circuit
courts of appeals split over at least three separate issues regarding
the application of the exemption.8 The Personal Injuries Exemption
should be narrowed significantly by giving it a clear definition tied to
a sound theoretical foundation9 These changes would alleviate many
of the current problems and give courts and the Internal Revenue
Service (the "Service") guidance in dealing with future problems. It
would also raise revenue and eliminate a major incentive to sue.
It is a rare occurrence when the political will for change arises
at the precise moment when an often-overlooked area of law most
needs amending.1o Such is the case today as a result of the confluence
between America's desire for tort reform and the need for congres-
sional action regarding the Personal Injuries Exemption. America
currently needs and wants tort reform. Indeed, such reform was one
of the major provisions of the Contract with America that helped
4. See Part IV.B for a more detailed discussion of these problems.
5. See, for example, United States v. Centennial Savings Bank, 499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991).
6. In fact, the reach of section 104(a)(2) has been extended so far that it has recently been
argued that no litigant should ever have to pay taxes on any damage award, even if the claim's
origins were purely contractual. See William L. Raby, Why Should Anyone Pay Taxes on
Litigation Settlements?, 63 Tax Notes 213, 215 (April 11, 1994) (arguing that the exclusion from
income of settlement awards sounding in tort raises ethical questions for tax practitioners and
judges).
7. See Part IVA.
8. See Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C. One of the three splits was presumably resolved by
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (holding that
damages received under the pre-1991 version of Title VII did not constitute tax-exempt personal
injuries under section 104(a)(2)). The second was presumably resolved by Commissioner v.
Schleier, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044 (holding that damages received under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act are not tax exempt). It is not clear, however, whether these two cases will
truly resolve the issues.
9. See Part IV.C.
10. Indeed, the literature is full of calls for reform and outright repeal of section 104(a)(2).
See, for example, Part MAL Notably, however, none of these proposals seems to have been
implemented by Congress or the courts. For a discussion on why such calls for reform have not
been answered, see Part IV.D.
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catapult the Republicans to electoral victory in 1994.11 Because
section 104(a)(2) serves as a significant incentive to litigate, Congress
currently has an opportunity to use the political will for tort reform to
simultaneously limit one of the largest and least justified tax
expenditures in the Code-the tax-exempt status of damage awards
received on account of personal injuries.
Parts II and III of this Note discuss the legal background of
and recent developments in the Personal Injuries Exemption. Part IV
analyzes the problems arising from the exemption's current
application in more detail and proposes a statutory amendment to
section 104(a)(2) which narrows the exclusion by giving it a clear
definition which is closely tied to a sound theoretical foundation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Origins and Framework of the Exemption
The predecessor of section 104(a)(2) was first enacted in the
1918 Code in order to clarify the law as Congress believed it then
existed.12 It was based on an opinion of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that argued that, like the proceeds of life
insurance policies, damages received in order to compensate the
taxpayer for physical injuries were not taxable as income, but
instead constituted a return on capital.' 3 The exemption was re-
11. Saundra Torry, On the Docket: Trial Lawyers v. Tort Reformers, Wash. Post,
Washington Business 7 (November 21, 1994). Initial proposals for such reform included caps on
punitive damages, changes in the rules governing products liabilities cases, and adoption of the
"English Rule" whereby the losing party in a lawsuit must pay the legal expenses of the winning
party. Id.
As of this writing, the House of Representatives has already begun consideration of a bill
"[t]o reform the Federal civil justice system; to reform product liability law." H.R. 10, 104th
Cong. 1st Sess. (January 4, 1995). The first item of the bill, entitled the "Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act of 1995," awards attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Id. at § 101.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918) exempted "[a]mounts received, through accident or health
insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or
sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of
such injuries or sickness." H.R. Rep. 767, 56th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 Cum. Bul.
86, 92 (1918), stated that "Under the present law it is doubtful whether.., damages received on
account of such injuries or sickness ...are required to be included in gross income. The
proposed bill [Revenue Act of 1918) provides that such amounts shall not be included in gross
income."
13. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918). The Commissioner in turn based his
decision on an opinion of the Attorney General holding that the proceeds of a life insurance
policy were not taxable because they were a return on capital. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918)
(stating that such proceeds "merely take the place of capital in human ability which was
1462
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enacted in the 1939 and 1954 Codes and was amended in 1982 and
again in 1989.14
Significantly, neither the Code nor the regulations have ever
defined "personal injuries or sickness." Moreover, although the regu-
lations do define "damages received," the definition does no more than
link the term to traditional tort law principles. 15 This statutory ambi-
guity represents one of the major causes for the expansive reading
courts have given the Personal Injuries Exemption.
B. Theories Underlying the Exemption
A survey of the literature on section 104(a)(2) reveals a trou-
bling fact: no consensus exists regarding the underlying justification
for its existence. Scholars, however, have suggested several possible
justifications, the most common of which is the return of capital
theory. According to proponents of this theory, personal injury dam-
ages represent a return of capital and thus do not constitute a taxable
gain. This was the initial approach taken by both Congress and the
Commissioner,16 and is the approach which has had the most overall
acceptance.17 Most recently, Professor Kahn argued for its adoption in
his article on the subject.18
destroyed"). This theory is further supported by the position of the Service that the exclusion,
as originally enacted, applied only to those damages which were received on account of physical
injuries. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
14. I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939); I.R.C. § 104 (1954). In 1982 it was amended to add "and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments." Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 101(a). This was in-
tended to be a codification of existing law rather than a change. S. Rep. No. 97-646, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 4 (1982). In 1989 it was again amended. See note 3.
15. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1995) reads:
(c) Damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness. Section 104(a)(2) ex-
cludes from gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The term "damages received
(whether by suit or agreement)" means an amount received (other than workmen's com-
pensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type
rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.
16. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court decision of Burnet v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), clarified once and for all that recovery of a taxpayer's basis in
capital was not a taxable event and so was beyond the reach of the income tax. Id. at 413.
17. See Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that
"[diamages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the
taxpayer whole from a previous loss of personal rights because, in effect, they restore a loss to
capital"). This approach also seems to have been the basis of several recent circuit court deci-
sions regarding the taxability of punitive damages. See, for example, Hawkins v. United States,
30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's decision
as based on a "restoration of capital rule!), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4093; Reese v. United
States, 24 F.3d 228, 231 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (observing that "section 104's enumerated categories
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1459
The return of capital theory is powerful in its simplicity and
intuitive logic. Its attempt to recharacterize what is essentially a
policy-based exemption as a tax-based one, however, cannot survive
close scrutiny and has been severely criticized. 19 For a gain to be a
tax-exempt return of capital, the taxpayer must first have a basis in
his or her investment, for money received over and above that basis is
taxed as income. Professor Kahn's theory does not deal sufficiently
with the fact that people do not have a basis in their bodies, as they
invested no money to purchase them. Moreover, the argument that
the cost of maintaining our bodies constitutes our basis20 is disingenu-
ous because it ignores the personal exemption and standard deduction
received each year for just this purpose. 21 Although Congress initially
assumed that the exemption was based on tax logic, 22 Congress used a
pre-Glenshaw Glass definition of income.23  The Supreme Court's
current broad definition of income24 suggests that the Personal Inju-
ries Exemption can only be justified as a policy-based exception to the
general rule that all gain, from whatever source, is taxable as income.
Closely related to the return of capital theory is the idea that
compensation for personal injuries should not be taxed because it does
encompass only the replacement of losses resulting from injury or sickness'; Commissioner v.
Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Starrels with approval).
18. Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax
or Not to Tax?, 2 Fl. Tax Rev. 327 (1995).
19. See, for example, Horton v. Commissioner, 100 Tax Ct. 93, 95 (1993) (stating that the
Tax Court has long since rejected the return on capital theory); Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084 (Trott,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[a]lthough I agree that the majority's restoration of the capital rule
may make sense as a matter of policy, I don't think the text of § 104(a)(2), its legislative history,
or the case law can be squared with the majority's interpretation").
Scholars have also criticized the return of capital theory extensively. See, for example,
Joseph W. Blackburn, Taxation of Personal Injury Damages: Recommendations for Reform, 56
Tenn. L. Rev. 661, 668 (1989) (calling the theory "insufficient to fully explain section 104(a)(2)';
Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
43, 45-46 (1988) (calling the theory appealing if involving the "loss of a limb or organ" but
insufficient as not addressing the taxpayer's lack of a basis in his or her body); Margaret
Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage
Recoveries, 45 Tax Law. 783, 796 (1992) (criticizing the theory as not taking into account the
tax-exempt status of punitive damages); Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and
Non-tax Policy Considerations, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 701, 711-13 (1977) (arguing that the theory
fails to take into account the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) of lost earnings).
20. This argument suggests that as we pay for the food and medical expenses necessary to
survive, our initial basis of zero should be increased. Thus, damages received on account of
personal injuries merely replace these expenditures and should not be taxable as a gain.
21. 26 U.S.C. §§ 151-53. 26 U.S.C. § 63(c). See also Jennifer J. S. Brooks, Developing a
Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 759, 766-68 (1988) (arguing that
self-maintenance costs do not constitute the taxpayer's paid-in basis in his or her body since
such costs are already deducted in the personal exemption and standard deduction).
22. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
23. See notes 1, 12-13 and accompanying text.
24. See note 1.
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no more than make the taxpayer whole again.25 Although this seems
to be merely a reformulation of the return of capital theory, it is not
based on tax logic and so avoids much of the criticism which has been
leveled at that theory.26 Also closely related to the return of capital
theory is one commentator's argument that the exemption is really
based on a sort of intuitive economics.27
Two other theories justify the exemption on the basis of its
similarity to other types of exempt income. The first is that damage
awards in personal injury suits resemble imputed income.28 Under
this theory, such damages are exempt since they compensate the
victim for intangibles which would not otherwise be taxed. The prob-
lem with this theory, however, is that imputed income is exempt
because of the difficulties inherent in defining and administering such
income, whereas no such infirmities exist regarding personal injury
damages.29 The other theory, that damage awards represent involun-
tary transactions analogous to ones in the Code that are exempt, also
fails under close scrutiny.30
A third major approach that commentators have taken has
been to argue that section 104(a)(2), whatever its origins, owes its
continuing existence to Congress's compassion. 31 Concern for injured
25. See, for example, Brooks, 14 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. at 768-69 (cited in note 21)
(discussing the merits of the theory); Robert J. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The
Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. Rev. 701, 724 (1986) (discussing the merits
of the theory).
26. The criticism that the return of capital theory fails to take into account the taxpayer's
lack of a quantifiable basis in his or her body, for example, does not seem to apply. It is not
clear to this Author why the theory has received so little attention, however. It may be because
the theory is so closely associated with the return of capital theory.
27. Brooks, 14 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. at 804-05 (cited in note 21). Although there is noth-
ing wrong with this theory per se, Congress's intuition would appear to be a somewhat weak
foundation for such an enormous exemption.
28. See, for example, Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 713-14 (cited in note 19) (arguing that
the most convincing theory for section 104(a)(2) is that since the benefits a taxpayer receives
from his or her body are not taxed-because such benefits would be non-taxable imputed
income--compensation intended to repair that body should also not be taxed); Brooks, 14 Win.
Mitchell L. Rev. at 769-73 (cited in note 21) (comparing damage awards with the return of
tortiously converted items and with imputed income).
Imputed income includes acts such as an accountant's preparation of his or her own tax
returns. While such actions are clearly gains, Congress neither can nor desires to tax them.
501 Tax Manage. Portfolios (BNA) A-10 (1992).
29. Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 48-49 (cited in note 19).
30. Id. at 46-47 (comparing damage awards with § 1033 deductions). According to
Professor Kahn, "[i]nvoluntariness alone is not a sufficient justification for this extraordinary
exclusionary treatment since the involuntary conversion of tangible property is not treated so
gently." Kahn, 2 Fl. Tax Rev. at 348 (cited in note 18).
31. Bertram Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 614, 626 (1952) (stating that "the
treatment of lost earnings is rooted in emotional and traditional, rather than logical, factors).
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taxpayers, especially those with physical injuries, has prompted Con-
gress not to repeal the provision.32 Moreover, damage awards might
not cover all of the medical and legal expenses incurred by the tax-
payer were they subject to tax,33 a result which would defeat the
primary goal of tort law, the compensation of victims for personal
injuries. 34 Compassion for injured taxpayers as a theory also helps
explain why courts have been so willing to expand the scope of the
exemption to a variety of new causes of action. Aside from being more
of an explanation than a justification, however, compassion as a
theory fails in that it does not take into account either the increasing
size of damage awards or the tax-exempt status of punitive damages,
which are awarded on the basis of the defendant's degree of
culpability, not the plaintiffs degree of injury.35
The fourth and least satisfying approach has been to base the
exemption on administrative concerns. For example, because awards
are often paid in lump sums, injured taxpayers would have to pay a
higher rate of tax due to bunching of income.36 Difficulties with the
allocation of awards, for example between taxable and exempt income,
have also been cited as potential justifications for the current sys-
tem.37 Finally, commentators have suggested that the exemption
serves as a subsidy to help ease the potentially enormous burden on
tortfeasors. 8 None of these administrative concerns, however, seems
sufficient to justify the enormous size of the Personal Injuries Exemp-
tion.
32. It has also been suggested that the exemption is based on the fact that taxing personal
injury damages would be a "vulturous act-analogous to feeding off of the flesh of a
dismembered arm or leg or off of the corpse of a recently departed." Kahn, 2 Fl. Tax Rev. at 349
(cited in note 18).
33. See Miller v. Commissioner, 93 Tax Ct. 330, 341 (1989) (holding that "[plunitive
damages have served as a means of compensating plaintiffs for intangible harm and for costs
and attorneys' fees," presumably because compensatory damages are not always large enough to
cover the costs and attorneys' fees).
34. Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 Camb. L. J. 238, 238 (1944)
(explaining that "It]he purpose of the law of torts is ... to afford compensation for injuries
sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another") (quoted with approval in
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 6 (West, 4th ed. 1971)).
35. Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 50-51 (cited in note 19). See also Yorio, 62
Cornell L. Rev. at 707 (cited in note 19) (arguing that if sympathy is the true basis for the
exemption, it does not go far enough).
36. Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 714-19 (cited in note 19); Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
at 49-51 (cited in note 19); Kahn, 2 Fla. Tax Rev. at 340 (cited in note 18).
37. Henning, 45 Tax Law. at'797 (cited in note 19); Henry, 23 Hous. L. Rev. at 726 (cited
in note 25).
38. Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 719-22 (cited in note 19) (noting that the danger of exces-
sively high judgments is exacerbated by the progressive tax structure).
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Notably, with the exception of the administrative concerns
theory, all of these approaches are based on the idea that an injured
taxpayer who receives compensation for his or her injuries has not
profited. To the degree that compensation merely makes the tort
victim whole again, there seems to be no reason to tax the damage
award. It is this overarching policy concern that this Note proposes to
use as the basis for a statutory amendment to section 104(a)(2), an
amendment that would tax only those portions of damage awards that
represent some sort of gain to the taxpayer. The problem, as this
Note will show, is that the Service and the courts have been moving
further and further away from this idea in their application of section
104(a)(2). In so doing, they have brought within the ambit of the Per-
sonal Injuries Exemption a variety of claims which clearly do consti-
tute a gain to the taxpayer.
C. Extension of the Exemption to Non-physical Injuries
Congress's original intent, and the original position taken by
the Service, was that the Personal Injuries Exemption applied only to
physical injuries.39 In a crucial decision, however, the Service almost
immediately reversed itself and conceded that damages received on
account of certain non-physical injuries were exempt because they did
not constitute a gain.40 From this point onward, the adversarial proc-
ess ceased to serve as a limit on the extension of section 104(a)(2),41
and the Service's position was soon adopted by the Tax Court and
eventually codified in the regulations.42
Unlike in the case of purely physical injuries, however, when
the injury was to the taxpayer's reputation, the courts and the Service
distinguished between the taxpayer's personal and business reputa-
39. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 Cum. Bul. 71 (1920) (holding that damages for alienation of affec-
tion are not excludable).
40. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 Cum. Bul. 92 (1922). See Part II.B regarding the return of capital
theory. The Service later tried to reverse itself again in Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 Cum. Bul. 33
(1974), but the courts refused to acquiesce in this attempt to tighten the exclusion, see note 42.
41. See Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1877 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling section 104(a)(2) "an ever-
so-rare 'taxpayer friendly' Treasury regulation").
42. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T-A. 1023, 1025 (1927). See also McDonald v.
Commissioner, 9 B.TA. 1340 (1928) (holding, on the basis of Hawkins, that damages for a
breach of promise to marry were excludable).
26 C.F.R. § 1.1041(c), enacted in 1960, linked Section 104(a)(2) to "tort or tort type rights"
(quoted in full in note 15). Since tort law encompasses both physical and non-physical injuries,
such a connection would seem to suggest that both types of injuries are included in the exemp-
tion.
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tions.43 Damages paid on account of a taxpayer's professional reputa-
tion were considered to be in lieu of otherwise taxable lost earnings
and so were not exempt." Thus, only those non-physical injuries that
were strictly personal in nature were exempted under section
104(a)(2).
In 1983, however, the Ninth Circuit in Roemer v. Commis-
sioner45 reversed the position of the Tax Court and held that it was
incorrect to treat physical and non-physical damages differently.
Because the language of section 104(a)(2) makes no distinction be-
tween physical and non-physical injuries, the Roemer court looked at
the nature of the underlying claim in order to discover in lieu of what
were the damages awarded. 46  Thus, the entire award was exempt
under section 104(a)(2) if the damages were intended to compensate
the taxpayer for a "personal injury."
The Tax Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning three
years later in the pivotal case of Threlkeld v. Commissioner.47 Signifi-
cantly, the Tax Court adopted an even more liberal approach than
had the Ninth Circuit, holding that any invasion of the taxpayer's
rights, not only those recognized by traditional tort principles, would
be tax exempt under section 104(a)(2). 48 This departure from tort law
principles signaled yet another major extension of the Personal Inju-
ries Exemption, this time into the area of civil rights legislation.
43. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 Cum. Bul. 18 (1958). In fact, in Roemer v. Commissioner, 79
Tax Ct. 398, 406 (1982), the Tax Court held that the taxpayer had the burden of proving that
the injuries he sustained were personal, rather than professional. Compare Roemer with
Church v. Commissioner, 80 Tax Ct. 1104, 1110 (1983), wherein the Tax Court held that an
award for damage to the taxpayer's personal reputation is excludable under section 104(a)(2).
44. See, for example, Wolfson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1228, 1230 (6th Cir. 1981)
(holding that damages for injury to the taxpayer's professional reputation are taxable as based
on lost earnings); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct. 116, 120 (1981) (holding that "payments
for injury to professional reputation are not excludable from gross income").
For the origins of the "in lieu of what" test, see Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner,
144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944) (holding that the taxation of anti-trust damages depends on
the question "In lieu of what were the damages awarded?").
45. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 696-97. Thus, the proper inquiry is to "look to the nature of the tort of
defamation to determine whether the award should have been reported as gross income." Id.
47. 87 Tax Ct. 1294, 1299 (1986) ("whether the damages received are paid on account of
'personal injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry"). See also Miller, 93 Tax
Ct. at 330 (holding that all damages, both compensatory and punitive, are excludable in a
defamation suit). At first, the Service refused to go along with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Roemer. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 Cum. Bul. 55, 56 (1985) (stating that "[t]he Service continues
to believe the decision of the Tax Court is correct. Whether a libel in a particular situation is a
personal injury should depend on the nature of the libel").
48. Threlkeld, 87 Tax Ct. at 1308 (holding that "[e]xclusion under section 104 will be
appropriate if compensatory damages are received on account of any invasion of the rights that
an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law").
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D. Extension of the Exemption to Federal Antidiscrimination
Causes of Action
Consistent with its approach regarding non-physical torts such
as libel and slander, the Service argued as early as 1972 that, because
damages received in a Title VII suit were in lieu of backpay,49 they
were not covered by the Personal Injuries Exemption.50 However,
while still maintaining that damages received on account of non-
physical injuries were only tax-exempt when they were personal, the
Tax Court recognized that antidiscrimination claims such as Title VII
were more complicated than simple tort actions. To determine
whether the claim was personal, then, a court had to look at the com-
plaint to determine the nature of the relief sought.51 In Hodge v.
Commissioner, for example, the taxpayer's original prayer for relief
was for backpay only. Thus, although the case was settled immedi-
ately after the taxpayer threatened to add allegations of personal
injuries,52 the entire award was held to be taxable.53 While the Tax
Court's analysis in Hodge seems as first glance to have narrowed the
application of section 104(a)(2), it in fact invited abuse by taxpayers
who were sufficiently well-informed to add claims of personal injuries
to their original complaints.54
Ironically, the case which did the most to expand the scope of
the Personal Injuries Exemption did not involve a tax issue. In 1985,
the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Garcia,55 a case addressing the
appropriate statute of limitations to apply to section 198356 claims.
Apparently unaware of the tax consequences of the decision, the
Court explained at length and in great detail that section 1983 inju-
ries were personal injuries sounding in tort.57 This explanation had
49. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1994).
50. Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 Cum. Bul. 32 (1972). The Tax Court agreed with the
Service's position. Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 Tax Ct. 616 (1975). See also Seay v.
Commissioner, 58 Tax Ct. 32 (1972).
51. Hodge, 64 Tax Ct. at 620.
52. Id. at 620-21.
53. Id.
54. For a fuller discussion of this type of abuse, see Parts III.D. and IVA.
55. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
57. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 276-77. The court held:
After exhaustively reviewing the different ways that § 1983 claims have been character-
ized in every Federal Circuit, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tort action for the
recovery of damages for personal injuries is the best alternative available.... We agree
that this choice is supported by the nature of the § 1983 remedy .... The atrocities that
concerned Congress... plainly sounded in tort.
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the unintended effect of forcing the Tax Court to adopt the Supreme
Court's analysis and to rule that damages under sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985(3) and 198658 were all exempt from tax under the Personal
Injuries Exemption.59  Similarly, the Tax Court felt compelled in
Thompson v. Commissioner6O to reverse its earlier position regarding
damages from Title VII. Again borrowing language that the Supreme
Court used in another context, the Tax Court held that Title VII
claims were personal and hence tax-exempt.61
E. Extension of the Exemption to Punitive Damages
In the early days of the federal income tax, punitive damages
were not considered taxable.62 Thus, Congress never addressed the
issue of whether they were meant to be included in the Personal
Injuries Exemption. The Supreme Court, however, in its famous
Glenshaw Glass decision, held that punitive damages were taxable
because they constituted "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized."63 Applying the Supreme Court's new definition of income,
the Service in 1958 issued a revenue ruling stating that punitive
damages received on account of personal injuries were not exempt
even though the compensatory damages received in the same action
were exempt.64 The logic behind this rule was that personal injury
damages, to be excludable, had to be compensatory. Since punitive
damages, by definition, were not compensatory, they constituted a
taxable gain.65
Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-86 (1994).
59. Bent v. Commissioner, 87 Tax Ct. 236, 247 (1986) (holding that "[flirst, the Supreme
Court determined that Federal rather than State law governs the characterization of a sec. 1983
claim for statute of limitations purposes.... Second, the Supreme Court concluded that all sec.
1983 claims should be characterized in the same way.... Third, the Supreme Court held that
all sec. 1983 actions are best characterized as involving claims for personal injuries"); Metzger v.
Commissioner, 88 Tax Ct. 834,852 (1987).
60. 89 Tax Ct. 632 (1987).
61. Id. But see Sparrow, 1 89, 315 PH Memo TC (holding that a Title VII suit against the
U.S. Navy, when the Navy had not waived its sovereign immunity against legal actions, could
only be based on equity, and hence constituted taxable backpay).
62. Roemer, 79 Tax Ct. at 407; O'Gilvie v. United States, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8499, *13
(1992), reconsidered, 1992-2 U.S.Tax Ct. (CCH) V 50,567 (observing that "[plunitive damages
were not thought to be taxable income until [Glenshaw Glass]"). But see Glenshaw Glass, 348
U.S. at 431 (holding that "[tihe mere fact that the payments were extracted from the
wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable
income to the recipients").
63. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 (holding that punitive damages received on account
of fraud and antitrust violations were taxable as ordinary income).
64. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 Cum. Bul. 18 (1958).
65. See Starrels, 304 F.2d at 576-77.
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In 1975 the Service reversed itself, holding that "any damages"
in section 104(a)(2) should be read as meaning "all damages," both
compensatory and punitive.66 This position was adopted by the Tax
Court as well as by the Ninth Circuit.67 However, in an unusual turn
of events, the Service reversed itself again in 1984 and began arguing
that use of the phrase "on account of' created a causation
requirement. 68  Since punitive damages are based on the
egregiousness of the tortfeasor's conduct rather than on the extent of
the injury to the taxpayer, they are not awarded "on account of
personal injuries.' 9
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Burke
United States v. Burke,70 a suit for backpay under Title VII,
was the first of two recent Supreme Court decisions dealing directly
with the Personal Injuries Exemption.71 In Burke, the Court sided
with the D.C. Circuit, and against the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in
holding that damages under Title VII are not exempt from tax.72
Rather than adopting the D.C. Circuit's analysis,73 however, the Court
combined the Sixth Circuit's focus on the nature of the underlying
injuryV4 with the regulations' focus on traditional tort law concepts.75
Thus, the Court held that the proper analysis is to examine the
66. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 Cum. Bul. 47 (1975).
67. Roemer, 79 Tax Ct. at 408; 716 F.2d at 700.
68. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 Cure. Bul. 32 (1984).
69. Id. Interestingly, in Burford v. U.S., 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986), a taxpayer
unsuccessfully challenged the revenue ruling's characterization of Alabama's rather unique
wrongful death statute. See Part III.C for a discussion of the subsequent debate on this topic
and the circuit court split that has arisen as a result.
70. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
71. The other was Schleier, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044. See Part III.B.
72. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
73. The D.C. Circuit looked at the nature of the relief granted by Title VII and concluded
that, since such relief was equitable rather than legal, the award was not excludable under
section 104(a)(2). Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434,438 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
74. United States v. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the nature of
the underlying claim is the key to whether damages are exempt under section 104(a)(2)).
75. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) defines "damages received" as damages received "through
prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights" (quoted in full in note
15).
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underlying claim to see whether it is tort-like in nature.76 The Court
then held that the existence of a broad range of remedies aimed at
compensating the victim for intangible injuries was the hallmark of a
tort-like cause of action, and that a claim which lacked such remedies
was a non-tort-like, taxable claim. 77
Having decided on the proper analysis, the Court next exam-
ined the remedies then available in Title VII suits-injunctions, rein-
statement, backpay, and other equitable remedies-and concluded
that they did not indicate a tort-like claim. 8  Rather, the lack of
punitive and compensatory damages and the fact that Title VII made
no attempt to compensate for the victim's pain and suffering or
emotional distress meant that awards received in Title VII cases were
not "personal injuries" within the meaning of section 104(a)(2)7 9 It
was on this point, and not on the appropriate test to be used, that
Justices O'Connor and Thomas dissented.80
Justice Scalia, in an important concurrence, however, argued
that the key question should be whether the taxpayer had suffered an
injury to his or her physical or mental health.81 Using rules of statu-
tory interpretation, he concluded that an appropriately narrow read-
ing of the exemption, in light of its overall framework and its linkage
of "personal injuries" with "sickness," could only mean that section
104(a)(2) was intended to apply only to physical injuries.82 Justice
Souter, in a separate concurrence, reached much the same conclu-
sion.83
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Schleier
Although one would have expected the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Burke to have settled the issue of the excludability of damages
received in federal antidiscrimination claims, another circuit court
76. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872.
77. Id. at 1871.
78. Id. at 1873. Congress amended Title VII in 1991 by providing for a range of remedies
similar to that which the Burke court suggested are indicative of a tort-like cause of action.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1988, Supp.
1992). Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 Cum. Bul. 61 (1993) held, after Burke, that damages received
under the amended Title VII are exempt under section 104(a)(2).
79. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
80. Id. at 1878 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 1875-77.
83. Id. at 1877-78 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter argued that the regulations
distinguish between contract law claims, which are taxable, and tort law claims, which are tax-
exempt. Since Title VII seems to have elements of both, however, the rule that exemptions
must be construed narrowly means that Title VII damages must be taxed. Id.
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split arose only two years after Burke.8 4 In what can only be described
as the perfect split, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits disagreed about
the taxability of Age Discrimination in Employment ("ADEA")s5
awards received by two United Airlines pilots. The irony of the split
was that the pilots had received nearly identical sums from the same
defendant as part of a single settlement . 6 The disagreement was
essentially a dispute over whether the plaintiffs had realized a gain.
Prior to Burke, damages received in ADEA suits had generally
been tax exempt.8 7 On reconsideration following Burke, the Tax Court
affirmed its pre-Burke decision in Downey v. Commissioner that both
the backpay and liquidated damages portions of ADEA settlements
were excludable.8 The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed.8 9 It read
Burke as requiring the presence of damages compensating intangible
injuries, in order for the damages award to be exempt. Because
neither the backpay nor the liquidated damages portion of the award
offered such compensation, the court held that damages received on
account of an ADEA claim were taxable.90
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, agreed with the reason-
ing of the Tax Court and concluded that the entire award was tax
exempt.9 1 It argued that the liquidated damages portion of the set-
tlement served a compensatory as well as a punitive function. There-
fore, since the claim included the possibility of tort-like remedies as
required by Burke, the court held that the entire award was tax ex-
empt under section 104(a)(2).92
84. See Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that ADEA awards
are taxable); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that ADEA awards
are tax exempt).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1994)
86. See Downey, 33 F.3d at 837; Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791. See also Kahn, 2 Fla. Tax Rev.
at 378-81 (cited in note 18), for a critical discussion of the split.
87. Downey v. Commissioner, 97 Tax Ct. 150, 168-70 (1991); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900
F.2d 655, 662 (3d Cir. 1990); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1990);
Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991).
88. Downey, 100 Tax Ct. at 637. See Parts II.E and II.C regarding the taxability of
punitive damages.
89. Downey, 33 F.3d at 840.
90. Id. at 839.
91. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 796.
92. Id. This seems to be the majority approach. See, for example, Purcell v. United
States, 999 F.2d 950, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1993); Downey, 100 Tax Ct. at 637; Bennett v. United
States, 30 Fed. Cl. 396 (1994); Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241, 1243-45 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
But see Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. IMI. 1994).
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The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the split in
Commissioner v. Schleier,93 another of the United Airlines cases, in
which the Fifth Circuit had affirmed the Tax Court without a written
opinion.94 Rather than using the analysis it had developed in Burke,
however, the Supreme Court announced that Burke was only half the
story.95 Now, to be exempt, not only must the claim be tort-like in
nature, as required by Burke,96 but the damages must also be received
"on account of personal injuries or sickness. ' 7  By a six to three
majority, the Court then concluded that ADEA damages are not
received on account of personal injuries and so are taxable as ordinary
income. 9 Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that the new test was
unnecessary and that ADEA injuries are indeed personal.99
The most significant aspect of this decision, however, is that
the Supreme Court's reasoning will likely destroy any certainty that
the decision might otherwise have brought to this area of the law. In
Part IV of the decision, Justice Stevens analyzed ADEA claims along
the lines of Burke and concluded that ADEA claims are not based on
personal injuries.100 If this is so, why did the majority then add an
unnecessary new test when it could have based its decision entirely on
Burke? The only reasonable explanation is that the Court was
attempting to narrow the scope of section 104(a)(2). This is an
admirable objective, but, as this Note will argue, one that cannot be
93. 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044 (1995).
94. 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994).
95. 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044 at *23-24 ("[We did not hold [in Burke] that the inquiry into
'tort or tort type rights' constituted the beginning and end of the analysis").
96. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872 ("In order to come with the § 104(a)(2) income exclusion,
respondents therefore must show that Title VII, the legal basis for their recovery of backpay,
redresses a tort-like personal injury").
97. In sum, the plain language of § 104(a)(2), the text of the applicable regulation, and
our decision in Burke establish two independent requirements that a taxpayer must
meet before a recovery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2). First, the taxpayer must
demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery is "based
upon tort or tort-type rights"; and second, the taxpayer must show that the damages
were received "on account of personal injuries or sickness."
1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044 at *24-25.
98. Id. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for its off-hand dismissal of
ADEA suits as not constituting personal injuries. Id. at *30-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[The
majority's] reasoning assumes the wrong answer to the fundamental question of this case:
What is a personal injury?").
99. Id. at *25, *34-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Age discrimination inflicts a personal
injury") ("ADEA damages should be excludable from taxable income under our precedents").
100. Id. at *20-24. Justice Stevens argued that although ADEA provides for jury trials and
liquidated damages, two factors that Burke held were indicative of a tort-like claim, 112 S. Ct. at
1873-74, the lack of compensatory damages is of such weight as to make ADEA not tort-like. Id.
at *21-22.
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accomplished by the courts. 10 1 In fact, the Supreme Court's attempt in
Schleier to narrow the exemption has already generated further
confusion. For example, what will be the new definition of "personal
injuries?" From 1960 to the present, the regulations have attempted
to define the term by linking it to traditional tort principles.102 In
Schleier, however, the Court explicitly states that such linkage is in
addition to, rather than an explanation of, the requirement that the
damages be received "on account of personal injuries."1°3 In place of
the regulations' definition, the Court merely referred to the "plain
language of the statute" and suggested that a personal injury is one
which is similar to an automobile accident. 1°4 Does this then mean
that the Court intends to restrict the scope of section 104(a)(2) to
physical injuries, as Justice Scalia suggested in his concurrence in
Burke?10 5 If so, what will happen to the tax-exempt status of libel and
slander claims?1°6 Although clearly tort-like, they are not physical
injuries. Moreover, if section 104(a)(2) is limited to damages on
account of physical injuries, what meaning can be given to the 1989
amendment to section 104?107
101. See Part IV.D of this Note for a discussion of why Congress is in a better position than
the courts to remedy the many flaws inherent in section 104(a)(2).
102. 1995 LEXIS 4044 at *37-39 ("For 35 years the IRS has consistently interpreted its
regulation ... as conclusively establishing the requirements of § 104(a)(2)").
103. Id. at *18 ("The regulatory requirement that the amount be received in a tort-type
action is not a substitute for the statutory requirement that the amount be received 'on account
of personal injuries or sickness'; it is an additional requirement'. But see id. at *42 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("It is surely more reasonable to read the regulation as defining an ambiguous
statutory phrase, rather than as imposing a superfluous precondition without any statutory
basis').
104. Id. at *11, *24. As Justice O'Connor pointed out, however, "the statute is anything but
plain" and an example is not an adequate replacement for a clear definition. Id. at *41, *32-33
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. "The [majority's] hypothetical contrast between wages lost due to a car crash and
wages lost due to illegal discrimination would be significant only if... one reads 'personal
injuries,' as Justice Scalia did in Burke, to include only tangible injuries." Id. at 32 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). See Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the "more
common connotation [of personal injuries] embraces only physical injuries to the person... or
perhaps, in addition, injuries to a person's mental health).
106. See Part I.C of this Note for a discussion of section 104(a)(2)'s application to non-
physical injuries such as libel and slander.
107. Congress amended section 104 in 1989 to add: "[plaragraph (2) shall not apply to any
punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness."
Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a) (1989). If Schleier holds that section 104(a)(2) does not apply to
any damages received in connection with a case not involving a physical injury, then the
statutory amendment seems meaningless. For further discussion of the meaning of this
amendment, see notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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It is also uncertain whether the post-Burke amendments to
Title VII 108 will survive the scrutiny of the Schleier test. The
amendments were carefully drafted so as to meet Burke's test of a
"tort or tort type" injury.10 However, it seems likely that sexual and
racial discrimination, like age discrimination, will fail the Schleier
test for a "personal injury." In fact, a pattern seems to be emerging
wherein the Supreme Court holds a type of claim to be outside the
scope of section 104(a)(2), then Congress amends the claim to meet
the standard set by the Court, then the Court changes its standard
again.
It is unclear whether Congress will amend ADEA to comply
with Schleier, whether it will amend Title VII a second time, or what
would occur after it took such actions. The Supreme Court's attempt
in Schleier to narrow the scope of section 104(a)(2) is an admirable
endeavor, but decisions such as Schleier are likely to do more harm
than good. Absent a complete overhaul of section 104(a)(2) by
Congress, the coming years will probably see more, rather than less,
confusion over section 104(a)(2)'s applicability to federal
antidiscrimination statutes.
C. Circuit Court Split over the Application of the Exemption to
Punitive Damages
Notwithstanding the Service's reversal, the Tax Court has
continued to maintain that all damages flowing from a claim for per-
sonal injuries, including punitive damages, are exempt under section
104(a)(2). In Miller v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that puni-
tive damages compensate for intangible injuries and serve the
purpose of reimbursing the taxpayer for his or her attorney's fees.1O
Then, after avoiding the issue in Downey,", the Tax Court reaffirmed
its position that "any damages" means "all damages" in its post-Burke
decision of Horton v. Commissioner.12 The court relied on Burke's
focus on the underlying claim to argue that once the nature of the
underlying claim has been determined, all of the damages flowing
from that claim should be given the same tax treatment.13 Burke fur-
108. Congress amended Title VII in 1991 in response to Burke. See note 78 and accom-
panying text.
109. Id. Title VII now includes jury trials and punitive damages, two factors that Burke
held might have made it tort-like and thus tax exempt. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
110. 93 Tax Ct. at 341.
111. 97 Tax Ct. at 150.
112. 100 Tax Ct. at 93.
113. Id. at 96-97.
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ther supports this position, according to the Tax Court, because it
considers the existence of punitive damages to be a strong indication
that the claim in question falls within section 104(a)(2)'s definition of
"personal injuries or sickness." 114 In other words, because to be tax
exempt, personal injury awards generally must involve at least the
possibility of punitive damages, punitive damages must also be tax
exempt.
Meanwhile, a split among the circuits has arisen as to applica-
tion of the exemption to punitive damages awards. The Fourth, Ninth
and Federal Circuits have taken the position that the "on account of"
language in section 104(a)(2) creates a causation requirement. 115 Be-
cause punitive damages do not depend on the extent of the injury
suffered by the taxpayer, they are not received "on account of personal
injuries or sickness."116 Even more importantly, taxing punitive dam-
ages is consistent with the title and purpose of the exemption and
with the traditionally narrow reading which courts give to exemptions
from tax."17
In an extremely insightful dissent in Hawkins v. United States,
Judge Trott described the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion as consti-
tuting good policy but bad law.118 He accused the court of ignoring the
plain meaning of the phrase "any damages" as well as the Supreme
Court's holding in Burke that the inquiry should focus on the nature
of the underlying claim." 9 According to Judge Trott, the majority was
making a noble attempt to bring order to section 104(a)(2) by return-
ing it to the restoration of capital theory. While this was sound policy
114. Id. at 99. Several lower court decisions agree with the Tax Court's analysis in Horton.
See, for example, O'Gilvie, 1992-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,567 (holding, on reconsideration after
Burke, that the key factor for determining the taxability of damages is the nature of the under-
lying claim).
115. Miller, 914 F.2d at 589-90; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080; Reese, 24 F.3d at 230-31. See
also Kempt v. Commissioner, 771 F. Supp. 357, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Estate of Wesson, 843 F.
Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
116. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080. This argument was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in
Miller, however. 914 F.2d at 589-90. Instead, the Fourth Circuit based its decision on the
underlying purpose of the Personal Injuries Exemption-to make the taxpayer whole again.
Since punitive damages represent a windfall to the taxpayer, it is only appropriate to make
them taxable. Id. at 590-91. It was this position that prompted the Tax Court in Horton to
argue that the Fourth Circuit might follow its decision in a case where the punitive damages
served a compensatory as well as retributive function. Horton, 100 Tax Ct. at 591.
117. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080.
118. Id. at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1084-88.
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for a number of reasons, such a drastic change in the law is the
province of Congress, not the judiciary.120
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, sided with the Tax Court
in holding that all damages flowing from an exempt cause of action
fall within the scope of section 104(a)(2).121 The court held that, al-
though exemptions generally should be read narrowly, the language of
section 104(a)(2) is so unmistakably broad that it must be construed
to include punitive damages. The import of the Burke decision is that
the nature of the underlying claim, rather than the nature of the
damages themselves, is the key to determining whether the damages
are taxable.122
Congress interjected itself into the debate over the taxability of
punitive damages by amending section 104(a)(2) in 1989 to exclude
punitive damages in cases where the underlying claim did not involve
a physical injury.123 The amendment has caused a great deal of de-
bate over Congress's intent prior to the amendment. The Sixth Cir-
cuit, along with the dissent in Hawkins, argued strongly that the
amendment indicates that the pre-amendment language exempted
punitive damages. If this were not the case, the amendment would be
meaningless.124 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, cautioned against
using the actions of a later Congress to infer the intent of a prior one.
Rather, it claimed that the text of the amendment was ambiguous and
therefore did not add significantly to the debate.125
D. Application of the Exemption to Settlements
Until quite recently, the application of the Personal Injuries
Exemption to 'settlements posed little reason for concern. Courts
typically examined settlements to determine whether the payor in-
tended to compensate the taxpayer for personal injuries. 126 In order to
120. Id.
121. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 1994).
122. Id. at 627-30.
123. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a). Congress amended section 104 by adding after the last
sentence: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness." The amendment controls any damages received
after July 10, 1989. Id.
124. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting).
125. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082.
126. See, for example, Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that
money received by a taxpayer upon retirement was not intended to settle any potential claims
he might have against his employer and so was taxable); Knuckles, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (1965)
(holding that a settlement was intended to settle the taxpayer's employment dispute and so was
taxable); Fono v. Commissioner, 79 Tax Ct. 680, 695-96 (1982) (holding that the original
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determine the payor's intent, courts would look first at the settlement
language127 and, if the settlement was silent or ambiguous regarding
the allocation of the award, would consider other factors such as the
testimony given at trial,128 whether the settlement embodied the in-
itial agreement of the parties, 129 and whether any of the initial claims
had been rejected by a court.1 30 The nature of the underlying claim,
not its validity, was and still is key.13' In the last year, however, two
Tax Court cases have suggested that well-advised taxpayers may be
able to manipulate the Personal Injuries Exemption in cases which
settle out of court. 132
In Robinson v. Commissioner,33 the plaintiffs, husband and
wife, received almost $60 million in a suit for breach of contract. In
making the award, the jury allocated approximately $1.5 million to
past and future mental anguish sustained as a result of the loss of
plaintiffs' business."3 Prior to appeal, the parties settled the suit for
$10 million, ninety-five percent of which was allocated to mental
anguish.135 Rather than blindly accepting the parties' allocation, how-
ever, the Tax Court ruled that the settlement's allocation could only
control for tax purposes if it represented an arms-length agreement
entered into in good faith by adversarial parties. 3' Since the parties
admitted to having colluded in the allocation, the settlement failed
this test."37 Instead, the court reallocated the award based on the
ratios inherent in the jury's decision. 38
While at first glance Robinson seems to be a well-reasoned
decision, it supports the proposition that a claim for emotional dis-
settlement, not a second settlement which reallocated damages to claims for physical and
emotional distress, was controlling for tax purposes).
127. Downey, 97 Tax Ct. at 161 (holding that the language of the settlement is the most
important factor). But see Metzger, 88 Tax Ct. at 848-50 (holding that the settlement language
did not control because it did not represent the true intent of the payor).
128. Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 Tax Ct. 1, 17 (1992) (holding that the testimony given at
trial suggested that about eighty percent of the award was for excludable personal injuries).
129. Fono, 79 Tax Ct. at 695.
130. Bent, 87 Tax Ct. at 246 (holding that since only the taxpayer's section 1983 claim was
still alive at the time of settlement, the entire settlement was tax-exempt under section
104(a)(2)).
131. Seay, 58 Tax Ct. at 37; Threlkeld, 87 Tax Ct. at 1297; Downey, 97 Tax Ct. at 161.
132. Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 Tax Ct. 116 (1994); McKay v. Commissioner, 102 Tax
Ct. 465 (1994). See Raby, 63 Tax Notes at 213 (cited in note 6).
133. 102 Tax Ct. 116 (1994).
134. Id. at 121.
135. Id. at 123.
136. Id. at 127.
137. Id. at 129-33.
138. Id. at 134.
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tress, when added to a genuine contract claim, may result in a portion
of any resulting damage award being held to be tax exempt. This
means that future plaintiffs may be able to avoid tax liability merely
by including claims for emotional distress with their contractual
claims. In fact, it has been suggested that failing to include such a
claim could subject the taxpayer's attorney to malpractice liability.139
More disturbing in terms of taxpayer manipulation is McKay v.
Commissioner,1 40 a case decided a month after Robinson. In McKay,
the prevailing party was awarded over $43 million as a result of the
damages being trebled by the Racketeering Influential and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"). 141  Although the jury allocated the
overwhelming portion of the award to taxable compensation for lost
wages and future damages, the parties allocated $12 million of the
$14 million settlement to the plaintiffs wrongful discharge tort
claim. 2 The McKay court followed the court in Robinson, requiring
that the settlement be the product of arm's-length negotiation
between adversarial parties.'14 In contrast to Robinson, however, the
McKay court accepted the settlement's allocation, largely hecause the
defendant corporation, during negotiations, had refused to allocate
any of the sum to RICO damages.144
The McKay court may be correct in distinguishing its case from
the facts in Robinson.145 Nonetheless, the court's acceptance of an
allocation that differed so markedly from the jury's allocation will at
the very least encourage litigants to attempt to structure their suits
so as to receive a portion of any award tax-free. This potential abuse
may be even more likely because both parties to a settlement may
stand to gain economically by such manipulation.
139. Raby, 63 Tax Notes at 213 (cited in note 6).
140. 102 Tax Ct. 465 (1994).
141. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
142. McKay, 102 Tax Ct. at 471-72.
143. Id. at 483.
144. Id. at 483-87.




The Personal Injuries Exemption is an enormous tax expendi-
ture14 6 that lacks both a clear definition and a sound theoretical
foundation. This lack of clarity has engendered disputes among the
courts and the Service and has resulted in a steady expansion of what
was intended to be a narrow exclusion from tax. More importantly,
the pace of the expansion has accelerated in the last decade, thereby
creating a host of new problems regarding the application of section
104(a)(2).147 Even a brief examination of these problems shows that
the exemption, as currently applied, is in need of reform.
A. Problems with the Current Application of the Exemption
The current state of disarray regarding the application of the
Personal Injuries Exemption is itself a problem. Federal law, espe-
cially that dealing with income taxes, should be applied uniformly
throughout the nation.148 The courts disagree over so many
fundamental issues regarding the application of section 104(a)(2),
however, that taxpayers living in different states cannot be sure of
equal tax treatment.14 9 Similarly, this area of the law is so volatile
that it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty what part of
a damage award, if any, will be taxed. More than merely indicating
the presence of a problem, such confusion is itself a problem. It
undermines faith in the Code and leads to strange and inconsistent
outcomes. 50
A second problem with the Personal Injuries Exemption is that
its current application encourages manipulation of settlements. As
146. The General Income Tax Problems Committee of the American Bar Association esti-
mated that merely limiting the exemption to physical injuries would have saved $42 million
over the five-year period from 1990 to 1994, with the bulk of that amount being saved in the
final two years. ABA Members Argue Against Exclusions for Punitive Damages and Lost Income
Under Section 104, 89 Tax Notes Today 227-16 (November 9, 1989).
147. See Parts II and III.
148. See, for example, David D. Willoughby, Recent Development, The Taxation of
Defamation Recoveries: Toward Establishing Its Reputation, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 621, 643-46
(1984) (calling for courts to apply a uniform standard). Note that Willoughby was writing even
before the three circuit splits arose between 1992 and 1994. His concern was that use of state
definitions of tort law would result in uneven treatment of taxpayers. Id.
149. The circuit split regarding ADEA is the best example of this. There, two taxpayers,
who received awards from the exact same defendant as a result of a single class action suit,
received dramatically different federal tax treatment for no other reason than that they lived in




this Note has demonstrated, well-advised litigants can structure their
petitions in such a way as to almost guarantee that at least a portion
of any award or settlement proceeds they receive will be tax exempt.151
This ability to manipulate exists even if the underlying claim sounds
predominantly in contract law, an outcome that Congress never
intended. Allowing such manipulation creates uneven treatment of
taxpayers who are in the same position and gives a tax subsidy to
unscrupulous taxpayers at the expense of honest ones.
The third major problem with the current state of section
104(a)(2) is that it provides windfalls for some "fortunate" taxpayers.
Those who receive punitive damages as a result of a physical injury,
for example, or those whose awards are trebled as a result of RICO,
will receive potentially enormous sums tax-free. 152 Thus, a taxpayer
who receives only a mild injury, but under egregious circumstances,
or from a repeat offender, may receive a sizable tax-exempt bonus in
addition to the payment needed to compensate for his or her injury.
This "litigation lottery" significantly increases a taxpayer's incentive
to sue. 153
Closely related to the problem of windfalls from punitive dam-
ages is the problem of taxpayers receiving tax-free awards for claims
that should be taxed as economic benefits. 54 Economic injuries should
not be, and were not intended to be, exempt under section 104(a)(2).155
This is indicated by the exemption's use of the word "personal" and
the courts' original attempt to differentiate between damages to the
taxpayer's personal and business reputations.56 All injuries that
151. See Part III.D. See also Henning, 45 Tax Law. at 783 (cited in note 19); Raby, 63 Tax
Notes at 213 (cited in note 6).
152. See, for example, McKay, 102 Tax Ct. at 465 (awarding the plaintiff $12 million tax-
free).
153. But see Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 64, n.182 (cited in note 19) (agreeing with
the argument in Boris I. Bittker, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation, 5.1, 5-5 (1983),
that repeal of section 104(a)(2) would result in larger awards and higher insurance premiums
sincejuries would attempt to adjust their awards to make up for the tax).
154. In McKay, for example, a whistleblower was awarded $12 million largely tax free even
though the award was primarily intended to compensate the plaintiff for future income. 102
Tax Ct. at 471. Likewise, in Threlkeld a plaintiff who suffered damage to his professional
reputation received his entire award tax free. 87 Tax Ct. at 1308. In both cases, the plaintiffs
received tax free sums which, if awarded outright, would have been taxed as economic gain.
155. Sol. Mei. 1384, 2 Cur. Bul. 71 (1920) (holding that "personal injuries,' as used in
[the predecessor to section 104(a)(2)] means physical injuries only'.
156. See Part II.C. The mistake the Roemer court made in eliminating this distinction was
that, rather than subjecting physical injuries to the higher standard applied to non-physical
ones, it lowered the standard for non-physical injuries. See also Blackburn, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. at
690 (cited in note 19) (proposing, among other things, that a distinction should be made between
injuries to the taxpayer's business and personal reputations and between personal and economic
injuries); Stuart M. Schabes, Comment' Roemer v. Commissioner, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 211 (1983)
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fundamentally affect the taxpayer's business or economic interests
should be taxed regardless of the nature of the underlying claim. Any
other application of the exemption results in an unjustified windfall
for some taxpayers.
The same analysis applies to other economic injuries to tax-
payers. The various federal antidiscrimination causes of action, while
being similar to traditional torts in many superficial ways, are fun-
damentally different and should be taxed as constituting economic
gain. The Supreme Court in Burke recognized that the two are dis-
similar but misconstrued the nature of the difference. The essence of
tort law is not the remedies available to a victim, as the Court
stated,157 but rather the goal of compensating the victim for personal
injuries sustained. 58 The underlying mission of the antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, in contrast, is to ensure equal treatment of all people. 59
Whereas tort law is concerned with compensating individuals for
injuries to their person, the federal antidiscrimination statutes were
enacted for the express purpose of protecting the economic rights of
minorities. 60 Because damages received on account of causes of ac-
tion such as Title VII and ADEA serve to compensate the injured
taxpayer for his or her economic loss,'61 typically via awards of back-
pay, such awards should be taxed exactly as if they had been recov-
ered in a contract suit.
Commentators have also identified a number of less immedi-
ate, but still significant, problems with the Personal Injuries Exemp-
(arguing that the Roemer court's decision to treat all non-physical damages the same was a
mistake).
157. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1870-71.
158. Wright, 8 Camb. L. J. at 238 (cited in note 34) (explaining that "[tjhe purpose of the
law of torts is... to afford compensation for injuries sustained"). See Threlkeld, 87 Tax Ct. at
1308 (stating that the "[e]xclusion under section 104 will be appropriate if compensatory
damages are received on account of any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by
virtue of being a person in the sight of the law").
159. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that "[tihe
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees"). But see
Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (observing that "[ilt is also the
purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination").
160. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
161. Id. See Schleier, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044, *31-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing
Justice Scalia's argument in his Burke concurrence that "employment discrimination, without
more, does not inflict a personal injury because it is only a legal injury that causes economic
deprivation!).
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tion. For example, the exemption is difficult to enforce162 and places
an added burden on the courts to allocate settlements for tax pur-
poses. 163  It is not applied uniformly because of its reliance on state
law.164 Furthermore, its current interpretation is inconsistent with
the other subsections of section 104.165 Finally, commentators have
criticized the exemption as being bad tort policy because it interferes
with the true allocation of costs to the tortfeasor and serves as a
major subsidy to insurance companies.66
B. Fundamental Flaws Inherent in the Exemption
The current state of disagreement and confusion over the
proper application of the Personal Injuries Exemption suggests, and is
caused by, two deeper and more pressing flaws inherent in the ex-
emption: it is based on neither a clear definition nor a sound theoreti-
cal basis. If either had been present from the beginning, the courts
and the Service might have been able to agree on a consistent and
narrow approach to the exemption's application.
The Code's failure to define "personal injuries or sickness"
removed the most important check on the expansion of the scope of
162. Henning, 45 Tax Law. at 797 (cited in note 19).
163. Henry, 23 Hous. L. Rev. at 726 (cited in note 25); Niles v. United States, 710 F.2d
1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that judicial review of allocations would be "bewildering");
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 696 (noting that the "rationale behind the exclusion of the entire award is
apparently a feeling that the injured party, who has suffered enough, should not be further
burdened with the practical difficulty of sorting out the taxable and nontaxable components of a
lump-sum award"). But see Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 707-08 (cited in note 19) (arguing that
courts are experienced at making difficult allocations).
164. Willoughby, 37 Vand. L. Rev. at 646 (cited in note 148) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Roemer as creating inconsistent applications because of its reliance on state tort
law).
165. Brooks, 14 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. at 761 (cited in note 21) (suggesting that
"[i]nterpretation of the tax code in light of income theory promotes internal consistency, more
accurate income measurement, and horizontal equity"). See also Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 (arguing that the use of the term "personal injuries or sickness" in
other parts of section 104-dealing with workman's compensation, for example-suggests that
Congress intended the Personal Injuries Exemption to apply only to physical injuries).
166. As one author put it, "[i]n appropriate circumstances, the cost of an injury is shifted
from the injured party to the party causing the injury. Presumably, the party causing the
injury passes the cost on to its customers, employees, and other constituents." Cochran, 38 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. at 59-64 (cited in note 19). Because the federal government does not tax damage
awards, however, juries can award plaintiffs the same net damages while costing defendants
less. Thus, the real beneficiaries of this tax expenditure are the tortfeasor and his or her
insurance company or other constituent. By reducing the costs of engaging in reckless behavior,
section 104(a)(2) distorts the cost allocation inherent in our tort system.
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section 104(a)(2).167 A strict definition gives courts something upon
which to anchor their decisions and helps them deal consistently with
new and old problems. In the absence of such a solid framework,
taxpayers were given the freedom to argue for a broad interpretation
of section 104(a)(2). This situation was exacerbated by the Service's
early acquiescence to such a broad interpretation.168 Seen in this
light, the expansion of the scope of section 104(a)(2) appears to have
been inevitable.
The other major flaw inherent in the Personal Injuries Exemp-
tion is that there is no consensus as to its theoretical foundation.169
Clearly, there is no tax logic for it. Despite its appeal, the return of
capital theory has been roundly criticized,170 as have other attempts to
justify its existence in tax terms.'7 ' Moreover, aside from several
unimportant administrative justifications for its existence,172 the only
other significant theories are unsatisfying. First, that the awards
should not be taxed because they do no more than make the taxpayer
whole again, is simply the return of capital theory restated. Second,
that Congress enacted section 104(a)(2) out of compassion, does not
167. See Part II.A. The regulations also fail to define "personal injuries or sickness."
Schleier, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4044, *37 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Neither the text nor the
legislative history of § 104(a)(2) offers any explanation of the term 'personal injuries.' " .
168. See note 40 and accompanying text.
169. Henning, 45 Tax Law. at 795-96 (cited in note 19) (stating that the "difficulty in in-
terpreting section 104(a)(2) and the inconsistent court holdings and Revenue Rulings of the past
seven decades probably comes from the lack of any cohesive tax theory or social policy justilying
the exemption. The Service, the courts, and the commentators have failed to find any entirely
satisfactory explanation of section 104(a)(2)'s raison detre").
170. Although Congress initially justified the exemption on this theory, it was based on a
pre-Glenshaw Glass understanding of what constituted income. For scholarly criticism of the
theory, see note 19. For recent arguments in favor of the return of capital approach, see
Professor Kahn's recent article, 2 Fla. Tax Rev at 327 (cited in note 18).
171. Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 46-47 (cited in note 19) (refuting the theory that
personal injury damages should be excluded as constituting a non-taxable involuntary
transaction); id. at 48-49 (arguing that personal injury damages, unlike imputed income, are not
exempt due to the difficulty in defining and valuing them); Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 713-14
(cited in note 19) (calling the imputed income theory the "most convincing argument" but
rejecting it nonetheless); Brooks, 14 Win. Mitchell at 769-73 (cited in note 21) (differentiating
personal injuries damages from nonincludable items such as the return of tortiously converted
posessions).
172. See, for example, Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 49-51 (cited in note 19) (noting
concerns that taxing damage awards would create bunching of income and might limit the
awards such that the taxpayer would have to use some of his or her own money to pay off the
medical bills); Henning, 45 Tax Law. at 797 (cited in note 19) (citing the difficulty of allocating
awards and settlements); Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 714-19, 707-08 (cited in note 19) (discussing
potential bunching of income and the difficulty of allocating the awards); Roemer, 716 F.2d at
696 (discussing the difficulty of allocating awards).
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seem enough of a justification for such an enormous subsidy.17 3 In
fact, so great and so unsuccessful has been the search for a foundation
on which to base section 104(a)(2), that one commentator recently
suggested that it is based on nothing more concrete than Congress's
"intuitive economic sense. ' 1 4
The lack of a theoretical foundation on which to base the Per-
sonal Injuries Exemption is troublesome because without such a
foundation the courts and the Service have no common understanding
on which to base their decisions. Instead, they tend to focus on differ-
ent underlying concerns and to use varying approaches to novel
situations. Were a foundational theory to exist, the courts and the
Service would be able to reconcile their different opinions and bring
order to an area of the law which is in disarray.
C. Proposed Amendment to Section 104(a)(2)
Once the two structural flaws underlying the many problems
in the application of section 104(a)(2) have been diagnosed, the solu-
tion seems clear. First, the Personal Injuries Exemption should be
amended to provide a clear definition of the phrase "personal injuries
or sickness." Second, the definition must be extremely narrow and
must be tied to a theoretical foundationY75 Narrowing the definition
would both limit many of the abuses existing today and make its link-
age to a theory easier. In fact, several of the theories break down only
when applied to the current, broad reading of the exemption.176
Although adoption of any clear, narrow definition which is tied
to a sound theory would greatly improve matters, it would be best to
limit the exemption to physical injuries. Such a definition would
173. Harnett, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 626 (cited in note 31) (stating that it is "likely the
treatment of lost earnings is rooted in emotional and traditional, rather than logical, factors.';
Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 707 (cited in note 19) (arguing that if sympathy is the true basis, it
does not extend far enough to achieve its objective); Huddle v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D. N.J.
1975). But see Susan Kim Matlow, Note, Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: Have the
Courts Gone Too Far?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 369, 393 (1991) (arguing that "[a]lthough the congres-
sional intent in enacting the predecessor of section 104(a)(2) is unclear, legislative acquiescence
to judicial expansion of the exclusion suggests that sympathy for personal injury victims may be
the motive for retaining this favorable tax treatment"); Stephen Ian McIntosh, Defining the
Intersection of Tort and Tax Law: Recent Developments Regarding the Exclusion of Personal
Injury Damages, 6 Va. Tax R. 425, 425 (1986) (calling section 104(a)(2) "a sympathetic gesture
from Congress'.
174. Brooks, 14 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 804-05 (cited in note 21).
175. See id. at 761.
176. See, for example, Henning, 45 Tax Law. at 796 (cited in note 19), who argues that the
return of capital theory breaks down only when it is applied to punitive damages. Presumably,
then, if punitive damages were held to be outside the scope of section 104(a)(2), the theory would
not suffer this flaw.
1486 [Vol. 48:1459
TORT REFORM
eliminate much of the manipulative behavior which currently exists
by limiting the potential for windfalls. It would also raise revenue
and eliminate a major incentive to sue. With these goals in mind, this
Note proposes to amend section 104(a)(2) by substituting the following
sentence in the place of the 1989 amendment (which would be super-
seded by the new language):
For purposes of paragraph (2), the term "damages received on account of per-
sonal injuries or sickness" shall mean any reasonable fees or expenses incurred
by the taxpayer on account of physical injuries or sickness and necessary to
make the taxpayer whole again.
This definition would sufficiently narrow the exemption by
limiting it to reasonable medical and psychiatric expenses, court
costs, and legal fees. Thus, it would ensure that the taxpayer is made
whole again but would tax any sums which represent economic gain,
including punitive damages and damages based on backpay or lost
future earnings. Moreover, it would reduce the potential for
manipulation by exempting only damages received on account of
physical injuries, thereby eliminating the ability of taxpayers involved
in contract disputes to recover emotional distress damages tax-free.
False claims of emotional distress would also be limited by the
requirement that only sums received to compensate for actual medical
or psychiatric bills would be tax exempt. On a practical level, the
amendment would be simple to apply because courts and the Service
could require the taxpayer to document the fees and expenses he or
she wishes to exempt.
Finally, the addition of the phrase "and necessary to make the
taxpayer whole again" would tie the exemption to a theoretical
framework and would thus offer guidance to the courts as to the un-
derlying purpose of the exemption. The theory is that the taxpayer
should be made whole again and should suffer no economic loss as a
result of his or her injuries.177 Exempting those sums necessary to
repay the taxpayer's medical and legal expenses, and no more,
achieves this goal. Although this policy-based variation on the return
of capital theory may not be entirely satisfactory when applied to the
current broad interpretation of section 104(a)(2),'178 it is sensible as
applied to the proposed narrow definition which taxes punitive dam-
ages and other damages that do more than put the taxpayer in the
177. See the final paragraph of Part II.B. See also notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
178. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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same position he or she was in prior to the injury. It has the advan-
tage of including elements of both compassion and economics.179
On the negative side, the potential for abuse might arise
because the proposed amendment may create an incentive for
attorneys to overcharge their clients. However, the requirement that
the fees be "reasonable" may avoid this, as might the adoption by
Congress of the English rule whereby the losing party in a civil suit is
required to pay the prevailing party's legal fees.8 0 A problem might
also arise in that it treats taxpayers with psychiatric expenses
differently depending upon whether the psychiatric injuries
accompany physical injuries. Such inequities, however, cannot be
avoided and are present in tort law as well.lsl
D. Factors Requiring Congress, Not the Courts, to Make
the Necessary Changes
Given that the basic solution to section 104(a)(2)'s problems is
fairly straightforward, and that commentators have been calling for
the section's amendment or outright repeal for almost two decades,8 2
why has so little meaningful change occurred? Part of the answer is
that the courts cannot easily affect such a drastic change. Every time
Congress amends the Code, while leaving section 104(a)(2) intact, one
can infer that Congress intended the contemporary judicial interpre-
tation of the section to continue. Courts, which are bound in matters
of federal statutory law by congressional intent, cannot completely
reformulate the exemption when Congress has failed to do so. This is
even more the case today because Congress amended section 104(a)(2)
itself in 1989.183 Its failure to make more drastic amendments
strongly suggests that it approves of the current interpretation.
179. Ensuring that taxes never result in a plaintiffs award being smaller than his or her
legal and medical bills is compassionate, whereas taxing monies which represent a true gain
makes good economic and tax sense.
180. Adoption of this rule has already been proposed by the 104th Congress. See note 11.
181. See, for example, William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 49-50 (West, 1971)
(holding that whereas it is difficult to win damages for mental distress "standing alone," "the
courts have been quite willing to allow large sums as damages for such 'mental anguish' itself,
where it accompanies a slight physical injury").
182. See, for example, Yorio, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 736 (cited in note 19), and Matlow, 44
Vand. L. Rev. at 390-93 (cited in note 173), both calling for outright repeal of section 104(a)(2),
one in 1977, the other in 1991. See also, for example, McIntosh, 6 Va. Tax R. at 454-56 (cited in
note 173) (advocating taxing punitive and nonphysical business damages); Brooks, 14 Win.
Mitchell L. Rev. at 761 (cited in note 21) (advocating a change based on "the idea... that pay.
ments to compensate people for the loss of value they otherwise receive tax free should also be
tax free.").
183. Pub. L. No. 101-239 at § 7641. See note 3.
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The courts are also bound by the precedent inherent in the
long and steady judicial expansion of section 104(a)(2)'s scope. Espe-
cially because the Supreme Court's decisions in Burke and Schleier
failed to reinterpret the exemption to the extent suggested by this
Note, the lower courts cannot do so either. Similarly, the Supreme
Court itself, the only judicial body which could spearhead a consistent
and logical narrowing of the exemption, cannot easily reverse itself so
soon after Schleier.184 Thus, because of their need to adhere to
congressional intent and to judicial precedent, the courts are
currently unable to redefine the Personal Injuries Exemption.
The other part of the explanation of why no real change has
been forthcoming lies in the fact that Congress usually lacks the po-
litical will to affect such change. The current situation is different,
however, because the 104th Congress may actually have the political
will to make this change. Tort reform was promised to the voters and
is being seriously debated.185 As a result, an otherwise little-noticed
tax expenditure may be able to draw attention to itself. Amendment
or repeal of section 104(a)(2) would generate a huge amount of reve-
nue at a time when Congress is counting every penny,18 and would
eliminate or severely restrict a significant incentive to litigate.187
Thus, if Congress seriously intends to enact a comprehensive tort
reform package, it should include an amendment to the Personal
Injuries Exemption. 188
184. See, for example, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (stating
that "[t]he obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity ... we recognize that no judicial
system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it").
185. See note 11 and accompanying text.
186. See ABA Members Argue, 89 Tax Notes Today at 227-16 (cited in note 146) (estimating
that merely limiting the exemption to physical injuries would save $42 million in five years).
187. But see Cochran, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 64, n.182 (cited in note 19) (arguing that
while repeal of section 104(a)(2) "would merely relieve the tax-paying public of its share of the
cost and reallocate that share to the parties involved in the accident," it would result in larger
awards and higher insurance costs).
188. See McIntosh, 6 Va. Tax R. at 454 (cited in note 173) (arguing that "[miuch of the
present confusion in the area of the tax treatment of damages could be remedied through
statutory amendment"); Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting) (suggesting that




The Personal Injuries Exemption is in a state of complete dis-
array. Three circuit court splits have arisen between 1992 and 1994,
and numerous other problems enable taxpayers to manipulate the
Code. Section 104(a)(2) is a gigantic tax expenditure which lacks both
a clear definition of its key terms and a sound theoretical foundation.
As currently applied, it does little more than create a windfall for
some groups of lucky or particularly well-advised taxpayers, while
encouraging participation in the "litigation lottery."
The exemption needs to be amended by adding a clear and
narrow definition of "personal injuries or sickness" and by tying that
definition to a sound theoretical framework. This would allow courts
to apply the exemption narrowly and consistently and would elimi-
nate many of the potential windfalls and inequities which currently
exist. Congress should enact the amendment because the courts
cannot and because the current impetus for tort reform may have
created the political will necessary for Congress to act.
Robert Cate Illig
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